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A B S T R A C T
This work seeks to evaluate overnight construction costs (OCC) and lead-time escalation of nuclear power
construction projects from 1955 to 2016. To this end, a comprehensive database of commercial Light Water
Reactors (LWR) was developed and a statistical analysis was conducted. Findings reveal a significant delay in
lead-time, especially for the last generation reactors constructed from 2010s, with ¾ of the sample showing
significant construction delays. This results in an escalation of capital costs rather than in a decline. Average OCC
of newer reactors is 60% higher than the ones implemented in the earlier stages of the nuclear era. This suggests
a discontinuity of the learning curve for both OCC and lead-time, which threats the market and financial sus-
tainability of current and future nuclear energy projects. Although this is a general trend, this discontinuity is
country specific and, thus, induced by national policies and regulatory frameworks. Therefore, the role of nu-
clear technology as an alternative to cope with the need for a decarbonisation of the power sector must be better
evaluated, taking into account the real cost impacts of nuclear technology implementation.
1. Introduction
The glorious times of nuclear power are under pressure. In the early
1960s and especially after the 1973 oil embargo, the nuclear power
installed capacity increased steadily. The historic peak was reached in
1984–85, with the grid connection of 51 new commercial operating
reactors (IAEA, 2017a). However, since the 1990s, the pace of new
constructions has stagnated given low oil prices and safety concerns
after the nuclear accidents in Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl
(1986). Recently, in the aftermath of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident
(2011), several countries have revised their nuclear policies and re-
inforced new regulatory requirements to strengthen safety systems of
operating reactors (Aoki and Rothwell, 2013; Huenteler et al., 2012;
NRA, 2013; Portugal Pereira et al., 2014; Soda et al., 2017; Srinivasan
and Rethinaraj, 2013; Vivoda, 2012). Following this tendency, devel-
oped countries, traditionally forefront protagonists of nuclear energy,
have phased down investments for new nuclear reactors. Confirming
the recent year's trend in Europe and USA, if no new reactors come
online and old ones operation licences are not renewed, nuclear power
share in the electricity generation will fade away in the next decades
(Tollefson, 2016).
Currently, expansion of nuclear power is being boost largely by
emerging economies. Between 2011 and the end of 2016, thirty-seven
out of the thirty-nine new operating reactors were based in China (23),
Republic of South Korea (5), Russia (4), India (3), Pakistan (1), and Iran
(1) (IAEA, 2017a). Nonetheless, experts flag up key concerns about
China's dependence on nuclear infrastructure and technology about
poor quality control, ineffective regulatory competence and limited
construction experience (Thomas, 2017).
In this context, the World fleet of operating reactors is ageing. As for
the end of 2017, the average age of operating reactors in the World was
over 29 years. Further, sixty-four reactors (16% of the total operating
fleet) have been running for more than 40 years (IAEA, 2017a), and the
extension of their lifetimes implies costly retrofits and envisages risks to
their operational safety. It may also raise transboundary environmental
issues and diplomatic tensions between neighbouring countries, as
clearly observed in the plans of the Spanish government to grant a 10-
year extension to the Almaraz Nuclear Power Plant located only 100 km
from the Portuguese border (World Nuclear Association, 2017).
Over the last decades, the nuclear sector has been promoting safer
and more complex reactors (IAEA, 2017b; Morales Pedraza, 2017).
However, none of the six different designs of generation IV reactors run
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by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) has entered in service
and their investments are being revised or cancelled, which hinder their
development. Further, most of the Generation III+ reactors under
construction, which include a set of advanced passive safety measures
and more sophisticated engineering components, have been delayed.
For instance, the Finish Olkiluoto 3 power reactor, a promising EPR
technology, originally scheduled to be online in 2009, has suffered
various delays. In the best-case scenario, it will start operating 10 years
later (May 2019) than initially scheduled and with significant addi-
tional investments. In a similar line, in the UK, the Hinkley Point C
power reactors, also an EPR technology, were planned to start operating
in 2025 with initial construction cost of 20.3bn GBP. However, costs are
estimated to be much higher as the government and EDF have already
announced delays even before the start of the plant construction phase
(NAO, 2017). Also, the small modular reactors (SMR), while a novel
concept, still face considerable technical, economic and institutional
challenges that will not be address in any near future time (Sovacool
and Ramana, 2015).
Originally, the “learning-by-doing” concept was introduced by
Arrow (1962) to explain productivity increases with experience for the
same human capital and investment. Empirically, the literature iden-
tified several reasons for this effect, namely more labour efficiency,
optimisation of design and supply chain and better use of technology/
equipment. This effect is generally observed in energy systems, such as
in renewable energy technologies (strong evidences for solar-PV and
wind-onshore). However, in the nuclear power sector, we witness a
discontinuity of the learning curve. This is partly due to lack of stan-
dardisation, poor design and engineering planning, shortage of skilled
labour, inadequate quality control, social concerns about nuclear risks,
and shortage of private sector investments. All these factors result in
highly uncertain projects of nuclear technology (Khatib and Difiglio,
2016; Sovacool et al., 2014a). Consequently, recent nuclear projects
face high risks and a higher probability of longer lead-times.1 As for the
end of 2016, there are fifty-four reactors under construction with an
average lead-time of 8 years (IAEA, 2017a).
The hypothesis underneath this work is that, unlike other energy
technologies, nuclear energy can actually lead to high overnight con-
struction costs (OCC)2 and longer lead-times given the uncertainty as-
sociated with tighten safety procedures and increasing complexity of
last generation reactors. Over time, nuclear technology has become
more complex, which required more labour and material intensive
processes, raising construction and operation and maintenance (O&M)
costs. In addition, environmental licences and public acceptance are
major reasons for construction delays and, therefore, overrun costs.
This suggests a discontinuity of the learning curve effect in nuclear
technology; i.e., accumulated experience results in a capital cost esca-
lation rather than in a decline.
Several studies in the literature looked at learning curves for nuclear
power and attempted to evaluate the effects of main cost drivers
(Grubler, 2010; IEA, 2015; Jamasb, 2007; Kahouli, 2011; Koomey and
Hultman, 2007; Kouvaritakis et al., 2000). However, learning curves
are influenced by a vast range of factors and it is difficult to isolate
specific learning effects (Khatib and Difiglio, 2016; Lovering et al.,
2016).
Grubler (2010) and Berthélemy and Escobar Rangel (2015) provide
economic analyses of nuclear reactor construction costs in France and
in the United States based on overnight cost data. These studies con-
clude that, contrary to other energy technologies, innovation leads to
increasing lead costs. In the same line, Sovacool et al. (2014b) in-
vestigate the frequency and magnitude of cost and time overruns oc-
curring during the construction of electricity projects built over time,
and concluded that nuclear reactors are the riskiest technology in terms
of mean cost escalation as a percentage of budget and frequency.
Cooper (2014) also evaluates nuclear power costs over time and con-
cludes that most recent cost projections for new nuclear reactors are, on
average, over four times as high as the initial nuclear reactors. In ad-
dition, Carvalho and Sauer (2009) compared the cost of nuclear power
expansion in Brazil against other renewable and fossil fuel-based energy
systems, concluding that nuclear is not the most cost-competitive op-
tion.
Lovering et al. (2016) also assess the experience curve of nuclear
reactors. However, in their study the authors conclude that there is a
positive effect learning curve of nuclear technology development. Si-
milarly, IEA and NEA reports also show that nuclear power costs have
dropped over time and will decline or remain flat in future (IEA, 2015;
Varro and Ha, 2015). However, as highlighted in Koomey et al. (2017)
and Gilbert et al. (2017), these studies assess the costs of reactors in an
overnight basis, which do not reflect contingences and escalation of
lead-time during construction in the overall construction costs. There-
fore, overnight costs do not reflect the financial risks of investment
costs or give a comprehensive picture of the cost trajectory over time.
While relevant to the field, existing literature of nuclear power costs has
mainly focused on reactors implemented in the USA and France, which
account for one-third of the World operable reactors. Nonetheless,
currently major construction of nuclear reactors occurs in emerging
countries, mainly China, South Korea and India, which emphasises de
need to expand previous analyses to emerging markets.
In sum, the state of the existing literature highlights the need for an
analysis of the historical experience and trends of nuclear costs to assess
the effect of time escalation, increasing safety measures and regulatory
procedures as main proxies of escalation of costs in the nuclear tech-
nology.
In this context, this work seeks to analyse historical trends of lead-
time, OCC and the cost of delay (CoD) of operable light water reactors
(LWR). In addition, it aims to assess key factors that result in the dis-
continuity of the learning curve, including increasing complexity of
technology, improved passive safety measures, tighten sectorial reg-
ulatory procedures, complex environmental licences, and public dis-
approval, especially after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. This ana-
lysis aims to show that the overnight cost of nuclear power projects is
not a realistic indicator to assist decision makers and investors to in-
corporate the embedded risk and uncertainty underlined in large-scale
projects.
Starting from a comprehensive characterisation of operable LWR
reactor data set, this study updates and extends the OCC of Grubler
(2010) and Lovering et al. (2016), assessing the learning effect on ca-
pital costs and lead-time through statistical analyses of pool data series.
Furthermore, the CoD has been assessed through the additional fi-
nancial costs that had to be incurred during the extended construction
time from the moment of construction starts (t0) until the commercial
operation (t5+n), considering contingences and unforeseen constrains.
The novelty of the study relies on the expansion of overnight con-
struction costs (OCC) databases and the incorporation of financial cost
analyses to assess the cost of delay of nuclear power plant (NPP) pro-
jects. As stated above, most of the available studies in the literature
have focused on the analysis of overnight construction costs (OCC) of
energy systems only. However, given the overrun time of energy
mega projects, such as nuclear power plants, OCC is not an accurate
proxy to evaluate the real costs of large-scale energy projects. To our
best knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to conduct a
systematic statistical treatment of overrun costs of construction of nu-
clear power reactors and to develop a comparative analysis of the cost
of delay in different regions and periods of time. Furthermore, this
study expanded the evaluation of NPP costs to the so-called “new
1 Lead-time refers to time difference between the construction start time from the li-
censing procedures and the commercial operation time, when the reactor is connected to
the grid after the initial test phase.
2 OCC is defined as the construction costs as a project was implemented straightaway
during day working hours and overnight. Therefore, this cost indicator is not sensitive to
lead-time delays and consequently financial costs, financial structure of projects, interest
rate during construction period and public subsidies.
J. Portugal-Pereira et al.
racers”, notably China, India, Pakistan, UAE and Iran.
This paper is organised as follows: following this brief overview of
the current panorama of the World nuclear operable fleet, next section
details the analytical framework adopted in this work, describing the
developed characterisation database of operable, under construction
and closed down reactors in the World and the statistical analysis
conducted to estimate the lead-time, overnight construction costs, and
the cost of delay. Section 3 shows the results and discusses the im-
plications of results in the future of the World nuclear sector. This is
followed by concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
2. Analytical framework
To assess the OCC, the lead-time and the CoD of the World nuclear
reactor fleet, this work encompasses three stages, entailing: (i) design of
a database of World nuclear reactor projects, (ii) statistical analysis of
the OCC, lead-time and (iii) overrun costs of reactors over time.
2.1. Database of existing nuclear power plants and planned future projects
From the starting point of IAEA power reactor information system
(PRIS) (IAEA, 2017a), an extensive list of the World nuclear reactor
fleet has been collected. This encompasses 662 reactors, including
phased-out, commercial operable, pilot, under construction and
planned nuclear reactor projects from 1951 to 2016. The database
covers not only key technological parameters, namely the net nominal
capacity (GW), the capacity factor (%) and reactor technology and
model, lead-time (years), and operation starting year, but also other
operational details, such as operator and supplier stakeholders. The
OCC (US$2010/kW h) were collected, largely based on Lovering et al.
(2016) and expanded based on IAEA reports (IAEA, 2016), WNA ana-
lyses (WNA, 2016) and country-based national reports. The present
study expands past studies by including data from countries that are
“new racers” in nuclear deployments, namely China, India, Pakistan,
UAE and Iran. Data were normalised to US$ in 2010 based on GDP
deflators and official exchange rates from CIA World Factbook (CIA,
2016).
Reactors were then aggregated by technology type, model, opera-
tional status, country and decade of operation starting and compared at
a global scale. This aims to assess relevant statistical parameters that
dictate the trend of lead-time, OCC, and CoD from the early nuclear era
of 1960 to present days.
Worldwide several nuclear reactor technologies have been devel-
oped, namely LWR, pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR), gas-
cooled reactors (GCR), and fast-breeder reactors (FBR). Over time,
however, the nuclear sector has converged towards the LWR tech-
nology, which accounts for more than two-thirds of all operable re-
actors around the World (IAEA, 2017a). For this reason, among the
overall nuclear reactors for which data were identified here, only LWR,
i.e., pressurised water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR)
units, have been assessed. Furthermore, the statistical analysis excludes
pilot and demonstration reactors, as “first of a kind” reactors are not
necessarily representative of commercial reactors. Also, reactors under
construction, whose online operation is uncertain, have also been ex-
cluded because OCC reported do not reflect the effective cost of con-
struction and are mere projections. This reduces the database to three
hundred and eighty reactors, equivalent to 57% of the total World re-
actor fleet.
The geographical scope of the database includes the countries with
the largest installed fleet among OECD countries, former Soviet coun-
tries, as well new comers, mainly emerging economies, including China,
India, Republic of South Korea, UAE and Pakistan. Reactors were
classified by technology generation according the construction year,
including Generation I, II, and II+.
While data collection and compilation was an objective and com-
prehensive process, readers should be aware that this study relies
mainly on sources from governments, sectorial institutions, project
promotors and implementers. Given that the nuclear power sector is
poorly overseen, it may be the case that initial OCC projections do not
necessarily translate reliable data. However, to the authors’ best
knowledge, there is no comprehensive and unbiased database of con-
struction costs associated with nuclear power reactors worldwide.
While the IAEA publishes data on aggregated technical and operational
parameters of the World nuclear fleet, it does not detail construction
cost data. Lovering et al. (2016) put a great effort to compile cost data,
but the authors also strongly rely on data from governmental sources
and nuclear agencies. However, the eventual “noise” introduced by
OCC data inputs has limited impacts on the results of this study, as the
assessment of the financial costs (Section 2.3) is based on overrun lead-
time, which is precisely reported by the IAEA (2017a).
As for the end of 2016, thirty-one countries operate nuclear power
plants or have plants under construction. Three hundred and sixty-eight
LWR reactors are currently operable with 343 GW of installed capacity,
which include the long-term outage reactors of the Japanese fleet and
the Swedish Oskarshamn-2, whose restart is uncertain. Further, fifty-
one new reactors are under construction and planned to start up until
2021, totalising an added installed capacity of 54 GW. Since the be-
ginning of the nuclear era, fifty-nine reactors have been shut downed,
mainly in Germany (19), in the USA (15), and Japan (8) (IAEA, 2017a).
The consolidated database is included in the supplementary materials
of this paper.
2.2. Statistical analysis of overnight construction costs and lead-time data
series
Two indicators (OCC and lead-time) have been subject of a statis-
tical analysis. The software package @RISK 7.0 from Palisade (2015)
has been applied to run the statistical tests of the data series to identify
the probability distribution function that best fits the data. The model
that best fits to explain the statistical distribution of overnight con-
struction costs and construction time is not known a priori. For this
reason, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973) was used
for that purpose. When selecting a model that best fits among several
possible models, it must be borne in mind that there are no true models.
There are only approximate models that cause loss of information.
Thus, it is necessary to make the selection of the “best" model, among
those that were adjusted, to explain the phenomenon under study. The
AIC criterion helps then to make this selection in a more scientific way,
since it compares the quality of a set of statistical models to each other
and choses the model that best fits to the data set.
2.3. Evaluation of overrun costs
In addition to the OCC indicator, the overrun cost has also been
estimated. Unlike the OCC, the overrun cost includes the interest and
financial charges during the delayed construction period besides the
intrinsic cost of the technology per se. This is an essential indicator to
reflect the realistic costs of mega projects, such as nuclear power plants,
given their susceptibility to unexpected delays and high capital risks
(Callegari et al., 2018). Although past studies and the nuclear industry
typically exclude this indicator (see Lovering et al., 2016; Grubler,
2010), the overrun cost from lead-time delays is a fundamental factor to
explain the escalation of nuclear technology costs. As noted by Gilbert
et al. (2017), Koomey et al. (2017), and Sovacool et al. (2014b), the
cost of delay contributes significantly for overrun costs in the im-
plementation of nuclear reactor projects due to overseen contingences.
Missing to assess the implications of regulatory, political, design and
management contingences and associated delays in the reactor con-
struction is therefore a crude simplification that does not accurately
reflects the full costs of nuclear projects.
Furthermore, the differences observed between OCC and CoD may
also be explained considering a complexity of factors commonly defined
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in the literature as the “planning fallacy”, as firstly proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), or the “Malevolent Hiding Hand”, as
identified by Flyvbjerg and Sunstein (2015). Both principles explain
that predictions of future projects tend to underestimate their time
needed to be completed and underline an optimism bias based on
certain heuristics. Planners tend to underestimate the time, costs, and
risks of future projects, which results in unexpectedly high costs and
benefit shortfalls. In this line, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) also sug-
gest that many failures of projects originate in bold forecasts, which
undervalue past risk analyses and negative exposures.
Actually, the literature reveals that large-scale technical and social
complex projects can face higher risks of cost overruns and construction
delays (de Bruijn and Leijten, 2008). Overrun costs are intensified by
“the strategy of making too low an estimate of the costs involved in the
mega project in order for the decision-making to go more smoothly at
this stage” (de Bruijn and Leijten, 2008), which seems to be the case for
projects justified by their strategic importance” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2013).
Therefore, the final investment decision (FID) of many nuclear
projects, seen as “strategic” in emerging and developed economies (Fam
et al., 2014; Thomas, 2017), is based on inaccurate cost estimates and
even on the lack of construction experience with modern reactor de-
signs (Thomas, 2017). In sum, cost estimation, inaccuracies of FID,
technological complexities and lack of social acceptability (de Bruijn
and Leijten, 2008; de Groot et al., 2013) are all part of a panoply of
reasons behind OCC in the nuclear industry history.
To estimate the CoD a discounted cash flow analysis has been de-
veloped, considering four major factors: (i) projected OCC, (ii) the lead-
time of each nuclear reactor, (iii) the weighted distribution of capital
cost during the construction period, and (iv) the average discount rate
for power generation projects. The projected OCC and lead-time of
nuclear projects have been complied in an extensive database, as de-
scribed in Section 2.1. The weighted distribution of investment costs
follows a sinusoidal function (Fig. 1), as proposed by MIT (2003). This
sinusoidal distribution has been originally applied to a standard lead-
time of five years and then translocated through a horizontal vector (Δt,
0) to reflect the time of delay assuming a common distribution of the
OCC. The discount rate utilised is one of the major influences in the
overall costs of energy projects, especially in highly intensive capital
projects, such as nuclear plants. In this study, an average discount rate
of 10% per year was assumed, following Khatib and Difiglio (2016).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Lead-time and overnight construction costs
Figs. 2 and 3 and illustrate the evolution of the lead-time and OCC
(US$2010/kW), respectively, of selected PWR and BWR units from the
early nuclear era to the end of 2016. Both figures present a trend line
for indicative purposes, showing a positive slope over time for both
OCC and lead-time. Results reveal a general increasing trend of OCC
and lead-time from the 1970s to the 2010s. While OCC and lead-time
were fairly regular during the 1970s and 1980s, recent nuclear projects
OCC and construction time vary significantly. Although data are very
disperse and this trend may be influenced by extreme high values, the
minimum values tend to follow a similar trend, suggesting a dis-
continuity of the learning curve. In addition, the lead-time and OCC
dispersion trend increases over time, which reinforces the hypothesis of
higher uncertainty and risks of nuclear investments. These results go
against the analysis of Lovering et al. (2016), but are supported by
other views in the literature (Gilbert et al., 2017; Grubler, 2010;
Koomey and Hultman, 2007; Sovacool et al., 2014a). A detailed ana-
lysis of drivers behind the problems associated to individual nuclear
projects is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, a general as-
sessment by Schneider and Froggatt (2017) concludes that complex li-
censing procedures in most countries, financing negotiations, site pre-
paration and other delays in the infrastructure development are major
factors behind nuclear power reactor construction delays. In addition,
as stated above, implementers tend to underestimate the OCC due to
technical, economic, psychological, and political factors.
Figs. 4 and 5 reveal in detail the lead-time and OCC, respectively, of
PWR and BWR disaggregated by decades. While in the 1960s, a nuclear
reactor would be constructed in average in less than five years (4.6),
with an associated OCC of 1723 US$2010/kW, in the 2000s the mean of
lead-time climbed up to an average of more than ten years (10.6), with
a mean OCC of 2637 US$2010/kW. This suggests a twofold increase in
lead-time in the last 40 years. More recently, between 2011 and 2016,
the lead-time declined to levels below 8 years. While lower than the
previous period in the decade of 2000s, it still reveals an escalation of
lead-time when compared to the 1960s.
There is also an escalation of the square deviation from 1.3 years in
the 60s to 7.5 years between 2011 and 2016 and the increasing number
of maximum outliners, which suggests a higher deviation in the lead-
times and riskier investments for nuclear power projects. The rise of
lead-times of PWR and BWR is clearly reflected in the OCC. In the early
60s and 70s, the OCC were averagely 60% of the one observed between
2011 and 2016. This goes in line with the hypothesis that, over time,
nuclear projects have become more expensive due to an increasing
complexity of technology, more efficient control mechanisms and more
safety measures. The increasing needs of safety systems and more
complex nuclear power reactors also raises the labour and material
intensity of the construction process. Although there is not a World
nuclear reactor material database or a detailed life cycle assessment
available to quantify, with precision, the materials required per MW
generated for different nuclear power reactor technologies, empirical
assessments of Gen III+ and IV reactors suggest that those more com-
plex and advanced than early stage reactors.
This discontinuity in the learning curve has different implications
across regions (Figs. 6 and 7). Regional factors that may influence the
OCC and lead-time include different national regulatory systems, local
institutions, public acceptability of nuclear projects and specific loca-
tion factors, such as availability of cooling water, seismic activity, la-
bour and material costs (Khatib and Difiglio, 2016).
In more centralised-planned and vertically integrated power sys-
tems, such as in China and Japan, the lead-time is shorter than in other
regions. This is mainly due to a strong centralised government, public
investment and fast licencing process, given the limited public parti-
cipation in the process and poor regulation of the nuclear safety system
(Sun et al., 2016; Wu, 2017). As highlighted by Zhou and Zhang (2010)
public in China has a general positive support of nuclear energy, as a
strategy to reduce air pollution in urban centres. Currently, the majority
of new nuclear reactors under construction are in China, which seems
to keep a good record of on-time construction period.Fig. 1. Profile of capital cost distribution of nuclear reactors.
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Japan's reactor fleet shows a similar trend, with a fairly stable lead-
time, nonetheless with evidence of OCC escalation among the analysed
years. Yet, it is important to highlight that the evaluated data series
(until 2016) does not reflect the on-hold nuclear projects, idle reactors
and retrofitting costs in the aftermath of the Fukushima Dai-ichi acci-
dent. For instance, the Hamaoka nuclear power plant, operated by
Chubu Electric Power Co, was requested to implement more resistance
tsunami breakwater walls at a cost of JPY 400 billion (US$ 3.7 billion)
(Esteban and Portugal-Pereira, 2014; NRA, 2013; World Nuclear
Association, n.d.). Furthermore, the 12 planned new nuclear reactors,
totalising 4.1 GW, are unlike to be operating in the future, given the
sceptical public opinion regarding nuclear safety in Japan and the
willness to expand the installed capacity of wind and solar technologies
(Esteban et al., 2018; Portugal Pereira et al., 2014).
In Western European countries, such as France, the standardisation
of the nuclear fleet and nuclear projects simplified the licencing pro-
cesses and the implementation of the projects. In general, the West
European reactor fleet follows a standardised design, which accelerates
the regulatory assessments and licencing process. Nonetheless, Western
European countries also reveal an increase of costs and high number of
outliners. For instance, France has done extensive efforts of standardi-
sation of its 58 reactors in order to simplify the licence process and
reduce construction costs. Yet, as Grubler (2010) demonstrated, real
costs ramped up over the last decades.
On the other hand, the costs of nuclear projects in the USA reveal
one of the highest costs and remarkably pronounced long lead-time. In
fact, in the USA there is a large dispersion in the standardisation of
reactor design. Therefore, the benefits of “learning by doing” are not
evident. Eastern European regions, which include a large number of ex-
soviet countries and Russia, reveal high lead-time and OCC and a great
number of outliers, mainly due to the political instability in the region
and certain number of on-hold projects.
OCC and lead-time indicators seem to follow a similar distribution,
Fig. 2. Lead-time of PWR and BWR units (years).
Fig. 3. OCC of PWR and BWR units (US$2010/kW).
Fig. 4. Lead-time of PWR and BWR units per decade.
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giving rise to the hypothesis that these parameters may be related. The
correlation coefficient between OCC and lead-time for data series is
0.48, which may be considered a value on the border of “weak” to
“significant” correlation (Suomalainen et al., 2015). It can be justified
by the increasing complexity of the nuclear technology resulting in
escalation of lead-time, higher OCC, possible overruns and additional
financing costs.
An interesting outcome is the positive significant correlation (0.29)
between lead-time and the reactor size, corroborating Berthélemy and
Escobar Rangel (2015) results. The average construction time for small
reactors (< 900MW) is 5.9 years, with a standard deviation of 2.5.
Large reactors (> 900MW), on the other hand, present a lead-time of
8.2 years, and a standard deviation of 4.4, which translates into higher
uncertainty and consequently higher OCC. This goes in line with pre-
vious finding in the literature (Callegari et al., 2018; Sovacool et al.,
2014b), reinforcing that the possible economies of scale of larger re-
actors are eroded by costs overruns and construction delays.
As for the OCC, the correlation with reactor size is positive but weak
(0.22), which shows that relying on the OCC for the evaluation of large
reactors can be a too optimistic approach. The importance of financial
costs incurred during the construction time is a relevant factor not to be
neglected on a realistic planning and evaluation exercise.
Figs. 8 and 9 corroborate the similar shape of probability distribu-
tion function (pdf) of OCC and construction time series as both of them
can be adjusted to lognormal functions. Although a high concentration
of values can be found around the average, the positive long tail on the
right shows a high dispersion of the database and the probability of
reaching a construction time or an OCC higher than the corresponding
average is more than 35%. This distribution shape represents energy
projects with highly risk parameters, such as nuclear reactors.
3.2. The cost of delay
For the calculation of the cost of delay (CoD), the profile of capital
cost of nuclear reactors was kept unchanged and assumed as a normal
distribution (Fig. 10). The financial cost of delay was computed against
the standard lead-time of five years for a discount rate of 10% per year,
departing from the calculation of the total cost including financial costs
incurred during the construction time (TOCC) and the total cost in-
cluding financial costs for a given standard construction time (SOCC).


















= −CoD TOCC SOCC (3)
where ST represents standard construction time (assumed as five years
in this analysis), OCCt stands for the value of OCC expected to be spent
on year t and LT represents the lead-time of the reactor.
The results indicate that more than 76% of the analysed projects
present a delay comparatively to the standard lead-time and that the
value of the cost of this delay represents on average more than 18% of
the TOCC. Fig. 10 describes the probability distribution function of the
total cost and shows that the adjustment against a lognormal function
of TOCC is increasingly evident. Compared to Figs. 8 and 10 shows a
longer right tail, reflecting higher investment risks embedded in the
financial costs of nuclear power projects. This demonstrates the im-
portance of assigning a monetary value to the delay. An important fact
to retain is the high value of the standard deviation, reflecting the high
impact of both OCC and lead-time factors taken together to assess the
overrun risk of nuclear power projects.
The economic impact of a construction cost overrun is the possible
loss of the economic justification for the project. A cost overrun can also
be critical to policies for pricing electricity based on economic costs,
because such overruns would lead to under-pricing. The financial im-
pact of a cost overrun is the strain on the power utility and on national
financing capacity in terms of foreign borrowings and domestic credit.
For this reason, this analysis shows that nuclear power projects involve
Fig. 5. OCC of PWR and BWR units per decade (US$2010/kW).
Fig. 6. Lead-time of PWR and BWR units per region (years). WEUR – Western
Europe; EEUR – Eastern Europe; CN – China; JP – Japan; USA – United States of
America.
Fig. 7. OCC of PWR and BWR units per region (US$2010/kW). WEUR – Western
Europe; EEUR – Eastern Europe; CN – China; JP – Japan; USA – United States of
America.
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unforeseen risks that result in complex and highly uncertain energy
investments. While such a fate does not seem to be specific to nuclear
power plants, but to energy mega projects in general (Callegari et al.,
2018), nuclear power plants still stand as the emblematic case of failed
energy mega projects.
The complexity of energy mega projects may come from the close
interaction of a wide range of drivers, including technical, environ-
mental, governmental, technological and social factors, that make it
difficult to manage the different interfaces to reach the initial goals
(Remington and Zolin, 2011). Complexity may also be explained as the
interdependence between several factors that are interrelated and have
multiple objectives and actors (Olaniran et al., 2015). It occurs when
technical, environmental, and legal factors, among others, interact so
closely that managing their interactions becomes difficult. Thence, the
level of complexity of a project grows as the number of interrelation-
ships and interdependencies among the different factors increases.
4. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
The accumulated experience with nuclear reactor technology does
not necessarily translate into a learning curve. Over time, there is a
trend of more complex reactors with safer passive systems and tighten
regulatory procedures. The increasing complexity and uncertainty of
nuclear projects suggest higher OCC and longer lead-time. This work
sought to evaluate the effects of these parameters in the OCC, lead-time
and the cost of delay of nuclear reactors from 1955 to 2016. To this end,
a comprehensive database of commercial LWR reactors was developed
and a statistical analysis was conducted using the @Risk project risk
management software. To our best knowledge, this is the first attempt
in the literature to conduct a systematic statistical treatment of overrun
costs of construction of nuclear power reactors and to develop a com-
parative analysis of the cost of delay in different regions and periods of
time.
There are significant delays in lead-time, which increases over time,
especially for the last generation reactors constructed in the 2010s.
Fig. 8. Probability distribution function (pdf) for OCC of PWR and BWR nuclear reactors ($US 2010).
Fig. 9. Probability distribution function (pdf) for construction time of PWR and BWR nuclear reactors (years).
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Results showed that ¾ of the analysed projects present a delay as
compared to the standard lead-time. This leads to escalation of OCC
rather than a decline. Average OCC of newer reactors are considerably
higher than the ones implemented in the earlier stages of the nuclear
era. This finding suggests that the nuclear technology is significantly
costly and takes too long to be implemented, which increases the pro-
ject risks, given its high probability of cost overrun and construction
delays. This threats the market and the financial sustainability of future
and current nuclear energy projects. Therefore, nuclear technology is
not at the forefront to cope with the need for climate change mitigation
strategies to contribute to decarbonising of the power sector. Unlike
IAEA ambitious forecasts on the role of nuclear power in the global
energy mix to achieve the Paris Agreement goals (IAEA, 2017), nuclear
power underlines high investment risks and uncertainty.
Given the lead-time delays and escalation of OCC, this study sug-
gests that the analysis of financial costs is an effective strategy to
evaluate meaningful direct construction costs of nuclear reactors.
Among the analysed nuclear construction projects, the cost of delay,
assessed as the financial costs, represents on average more than 18% of
the TOCC. This is a clear message to decision makers and private in-
vestors to rethink their energy investment strategies and shift capital
flows towards more secure, and sustainable, low-carbon projects.
Energy forecasts suggest that the electricity consumption will con-
tinue to increase steadily over time given a growing global economy
and given an irreversible trend towards the electrification of energy end
use sector. Therefore, it is true that, when it comes to building new
power projects, it is better late than never. Nevertheless, the matter of
truth is that never late is even better, particularly to address the climate
change mitigation challenge. Policymakers, project developers, im-
plementers and nuclear sector agencies should rethink hand in hand the
future implementation of nuclear power plant projects. This should
include: (i) adoption of better planning tools to avoid optimist bias and
over simplification of project implementation steps, (ii) development of
more transparent regulation processes to guarantee the safe and reliable
operation of nuclear reactors, (iii) improvement of current nuclear
construction cost databases with more reliable and trustful data, and
(iv) expansion of current databases with site-specific data, such as life
cycle material requirements of the construction of new reactors and
labour intensity during all stages of the reactor life cycle, including the
decommission stage.
Despite our efforts to conduct an accurate analysis of overrun costs
of the World´s nuclear reactor fleet, we recognise that our study has
limitations that can be dealt with in future works, to enhance the ro-
bustness of our findings, namely:
– Analysis of the so-called hidden costs or indirect costs, which in-
cludes investments on R&D and community level compensations to
host nuclear power reactor projects. In countries such as Japan and
South Korea, for example, implementers invest on community fa-
cilities, such as hospitals, cultural centres, among others, as a
compensation to local population directly affected by nuclear power
reactors construction and operation risks;
– A discount rate of 10% per year was assumed in the financial ana-
lysis, but this is an oversimplification, as different regions may apply
different discount rates depending upon site-specific contexts;
– The weighted distribution of investment costs was considered a si-
nusoidal function and translocated uniformly through the overrun
construction period. Nonetheless this is a theoretical simplification,
since it is not possible to acquire site-specific data on overrun lead-
time and construction status; and,
– OCC and financial cost analysis followed a top-down approach re-
lying on institutional, governmental and sectorial data. Adopting a
bottom-up methodology, such as life cycle material and cost as-
sessments, would evaluate site-specific data, which could refine
results and detailed socioeconomic drivers of NPP construction de-
lays.
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